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Abstract 
This paper investigates electoral outcomes produced by the two-round majority system in 
ethnically divided societies. Earlier studies, many of them focused on the southern US States, 
have revealed that in ethnically mixed environments, competitors with radical positions on 
ethnic issues perform particularly well. This paper extends this idea to municipal elections in 
Serbia, showing how radical majority nationalist parties exhibit particularly strong 
performances in ethnically mixed municipalities. While this effect is also apparent under PR, 
we argue that it is much stronger when a two-round majority vote system is employed. 
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1. Introduction1 
 
Can electoral engineers help promote reconciliation between ethnic groups and reduce 
conflicts? Electoral systems are among the key elements of constitutional design for 
democratising countries, and there is wide consensus among scholars of electoral systems that 
they can affect the dynamics of ethnic conflicts. The power-sharing school holds that 
proportional representation (PR) with large districts, or specially designed districts for ethnic 
minorities, may serve as a way to better include minority groups in politics (Lijphart 1986; 
Norris 2005; Doorenspleet 2005: 366; Rule and Zimmerman 1994, etc.). Another group of 
scholars follow Donald Horowitz in his criticism that PR-based power-sharing regimes 
contribute to social segmentation. This centripetalist group argues that electoral systems with 
preference votes may contribute to inter-ethnic conciliation, and the Alternative Vote is the 
favourite choice, as candidates are only elected with an absolute majority of the votes 
(Horowitz 1991: 191). In a nutshell, they hold that if candidates need to amass 50% of 
available votes in order to be elected in an ethnically mixed district, and if voters can express 
                                                 
1 I am extremely grateful to Bernard Grofman for very thoughtful advise, and for encouraging me to continue 
with this research. Hanspeter Kriesi, Jon Fraenkel, David Pupovac and two anonymous reviewers who provided 
very helpful comments. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 1st ECPR Graduate Conference, 
Essex, 7-9 September 2006, the ECPR Summer School on Analytical Politics and Public Choice, Turku, 19-28 
September 2007, and at the Conference “Reforming the French Presidential Election System”, 15-16 June 2009, 
Paris. Further, I am very grateful to several interview partners in Serbia, and to Dragan Milošević and Zorica 
Ćosić, who provided me with detailed data on the municipal elections in Serbia. The Swiss National Research 
Foundation has generously funded parts of this research. 
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several preferences, they might then cast their second vote for candidates with a conciliating 
program (Reilly 2001; Horowitz 2003; Reynolds 2006; Horowitz 1985). While they mainly 
recommend the Alternative Vote for divided societies, including Western Balkan countries 
such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (International Crisis Group 1998a), the two-round majority 
shares many of its features (Grofman forthcoming). One aim of this study is to ascertain 
whether a conciliation effect, which analysts have found to occur where the Alternative Vote 
is in force (but see Fraenkel and Grofman 2004, 2006a; 2006b for a more critical view), might 
similarly be observed for the two-round majority vote. 
In this paper, we set out to compare the effect of PR elections and the majoritarian vote on 
political radicalisation in Serbia, using two nearly-simultaneous elections: a local mayoral 
election (which used the two-round majority vote), and a national parliamentary election 
(PR). In keeping with our research goals, we considered these two elections in the context of 
an ethnically divided society. Note also that one of the countries, in which the Alternative 
Vote has been discussed is Serbia’s neighbour Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country where 
similar conciliating effects might result, but where the ethnic divide and tensions are even 
stronger. 
The academic literature on racially motivated voting behaviour has suggested that 
electoral systems’ impact on divided societies is highly context-sensitive. Vladimir O. Key 
has suggested, for instance, that voters from the majority community might vote differently if 
they lived in contexts with a strong politicisation of ethnic or racial differences. If voters of 
the majority are confronted with a conspicuous ethnic or racial minority in a majoritarian 
electoral system, they might move to defeat a candidate whom they expect to be close to the 
minority—i.e., they will vote for candidates who seem to guarantee the enduring dominance 
of the majority. In the southern states of the US, this engendered a paradox in the post-WWII 
period: in environments with an increasing share of racial minorities, politicians who were 
hostile towards these minorities had increased chances of winning votes and getting elected 
(Key 1949; Keech 1968; Wright 1977; Glazer et al. 1998; Grofman and Handley 1995, etc.). 
With this in mind, one might doubt whether the application of majoritiarian electoral systems 
helps to conciliate politics in divided contexts. Indeed, it seems instead to accelerate radicali-
sation. 
Key’s effect builds on the radicalisation of majority voters in dualist or multi-ethnic 
environments, and accordingly, we expect radical competitors to perform better, especially 
under majoritarian voting systems. We should also expect radical competitors from the 
dominant community to do better in multi-ethnic environments than in those which are more 
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ethnically homogeneous. Furthermore, in contrast to the centripetalist school, I expect this 
effect to be accelerated by majoritarian voting systems.  
This study allows for a comparison of two electoral systems. In less than a year, Serbian 
voters were called to the polls to elect the national parliament in December 2003, by list-PR 
with a 5% legal threshold and a single nationwide constituency, and to elect local authorities 
in September 2004, including the election of mayors in two rounds with a majority vote 
system.1 Serbia has recently experienced tensions with several ethnic minorities, and 
consequently, fits the picture of an ethnically divided society well.2  
The empirical analysis finds preliminary support for two kinds of radicalisation effects. 
Especially, it shows that a second type of effect comes into play which implies that 
radicalisation is stronger under majoritarian electoral systems than under PR systems. The 
Serbian case is possibly the first analysis which allows an empirical distinction of the two 
effects. If such a finding could be generalised to all majoritarian voting systems, and to other 
countries, this would have wide-reaching consequences for electoral system design in divided 
societies. 
The following section summarizes the relevant portion of the academic literature on 
voting behaviour in ethnically divided societies. It is succeeded by the empirical discussion, 
with a section on the Serbian party system and electoral system, followed by a section 
investigating the elections of the local mayors. Then I provide a general discussion.  
 
2. Explaining radicalisation in mixed-ethnic environments 
Ethnicity and ethnic divides – defined here using citizens’ ethnic self-identification3 – have 
frequently engendered political divides. These have been reflected in the formation of ethnic 
political parties, and have been shown conclusively to affect voting behaviour (Horowitz 
1985; Birnir 2007; Chandra 2004, 2005; Van Cott 2005; Norris 2004: 209-29). When the 
ethnic conflict between two or more groups plays an overwhelmingly important role in 
political life, scholars speak of divided societies (Reilly 2002; Grofman and Stockwell 2003, 
to name a few). Multi-ethnic parties—which include ethnic minorities and the largest ethnic 
group in a country4—remain rare in divided societies (Nordlinger 1972; Horowitz 1985; 
Grofman and Stockwell 2003). 
Previous research has emphasised factors that motivate the creation and determine the 
success of ethnically based parties (Tronconi 2006). The power-sharing school holds that 
proportional and decentralised institutions are best for divided societies, while majoritarian 
institutions exclude minorities from political power, allowing the dominance of the majority 
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group (Sisk 1996; Lijphart 1968, 1994, 2004; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; see Andweg 2000 
for a review). Some studies have focused particularly on the design of electoral districts and 
the resultant consequences for the representation of racial minorities (Gerber et al. 1998; 
Lublin 1999; Scarrow 1999; Richardson and Cooper 2003, etc.).5 
Looking at the political positioning of the representatives in ethnically divided societies, 
there are different expectations, and each of them leads to different implications for the choice 
of political institutions for multi-ethnic contests. We contrast the centripetalist school, which 
posits that majority-based electoral systems are the best choice, as they strengthen candidates 
in the political centre, with two opposing models, both looking at processes of radicalisation. 
Studying electoral behaviour in the US South, Key (1949) and Keech (1968) have high-
lighted a seemingly paradoxical phenomenon, in which liberal candidates or parties begin to 
lose electoral support as the share of minorities increases in an electoral district. This should 
be more than astonishing. If most minorities support liberal parties or candidates, liberal 
candidates should have better chances of being elected in constituencies with a relevant 
minority population. However, the contrary proved to be true. In an ethnically divided 
environment, members of the majority group were reluctant to support Democratic candidates 
who they perceived to be too close to the black community.  
There are two possible explanations of Key's effect. One of them is the threat hypothesis, 
which explains radicalisation due to radical political preferences. Local contact with other 
ethnic groups is associated with a perception of ethnic competition and fears of losing 
political control over the territory and economic privileges (Blalock 1967: chapter 5; Olzak 
1986; Tolbert 2003). This directly translates into more pronounced and more radical 
preferences on ethnic-nationalist questions, whatever voting rules apply. This might still lead 
to electoral system effects which emanate from the distribution of voting preferences on 
electoral districts. 
We suggest a different explanation of Key's effect, and rely therefore on a model by 
Glazer and colleagues (1998). Here, the effect is not based on exogenous preferences, but 
rather on context-specific institutional effects, which affect voting behaviour among the 
ethnic majority. While there are groups of voters of the ethnic majority with nationalist 
preferences who vote for nationalist candidates, and others with moderate preferences who 
vote for conciliating candidates (if available), the radicalisation effect in this model relies on a 
third group of voters with fluctuating voting behaviour. They belong to the majority, and have 
a strong ethnically based political identity, but no hard-line nationalist preferences, i.e. they 
do not oppose conciliation. However, because they perceive political representation through 
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the ethnic lens, they do not vote for candidates who might represent minority interests, let 
alone for candidates belonging to the minority group. These voters would usually vote for a 
moderately nationalist or a moderate candidate of their own ethnic group. However, in 
situations where a candidate is perceived to profit from the votes of the ethnic minority, such 
ethnically oriented voters of the majority group might switch to a nationalist candidate. 
Glazer et al. have applied this model (expressed in slightly different terms) to elections 
under plurality vote in the US, where often two major candidates stand in elections. In 
contrast, we differentiate effects by electoral systems. Systems which favour two-candidate 
races, in ethnically mixed contexts, often lead to a race between a nationalist candidate of the 
majority versus a candidate of the ethnic minority, or a moderate of the ethnic majority. If the 
elections are restricted to two candidates, then Key’s effect of ethnically oriented voters might 
come into play, as those voters will favour the nationalist candidate of their own ethnicity (cf. 
Glazer et al. 1998: 24). This would not happen in ethnically homogeneous contexts, as all 
candidates would be solely supported by the same ethnic group, so that there would be no 
reason for ethnically oriented voters not to vote for a moderate. We argue that the same effect 
does not apply under proportional representation, because a large range of parties allows 
voters to choose the most appropriate one according to their political preferences, and the 
choice of candidates gives them the possibility to vote for a moderate (nationalist) party of 
their ethnicity. Of particular interest however, are two-round majority runoff systems where 
supposedly in a first round, with a wide field of candidates, the radicalisation effect of 
ethnically oriented voters should not play a role, but affects the voting behaviour in multi-
ethnic contexts in the second round with only two candidates. 
Empirical studies looking at Key’s effect have so far focused mainly on plurality elections 
in the United States (Key 1949; Keech 1968; Wright 1977; Black 1978; Grofman et al. 1992; 
Grofman and Handley 1995; Glazer et al. 1998, to mention a few).6 As we expect differences 
between different types of electoral systems, we are trying to widen the scope empirically, 
looking at situations where we can measure the effect under different electoral systems. 
In their empirical application, the two models on Key’s effect lead to different hypotheses, 
which again are in contradiction to the centripetal hypothesis discussed in the introduction of 
this paper. The contact hypothesis, based on radical political preferences, expects that voters 
in multi-ethnic contexts tend to more nationalist parties under any electoral system. The 
hypothesis based on ethnically oriented voters expects a bonus for radical candidates in multi-
ethnic environments under the plurality vote or any majoritarian voting system. Finally, both 
these hypotheses challenge the centripetal hypothesis, which expects that majoritarian voting 
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systems lead to the election of more conciliating candidates in multi-ethnic contexts than 
other types of electoral systems do. While there might be differences between different types 
of majoritarian electoral systems (Birch 2003; Grofman forthcoming), the centripetal model, 
but also the hypothesis which expects a radical bonus of the majority vote, is based on their 
requiring an absolute majority for candidates to be elected, which in the end leads to a 
competition between two main candidates. 
3. Studying Key’s effect in Serbia 
Empirically, this article investigates the hypothesis of radicalisation in multi-ethnic 
environments under the majority vote, with the agenda of testing the appropriateness of the 
expected centripetal effect in the same context. Both effects are relevant for ethnically divided 
countries, and I focus on local mayoral elections, as they allow for comparison within the 
same country. With a recent history of ethnic conflict, and direct elections of the local mayors 
in several countries, the Western Balkans provide an interesting laboratory for this study. 
However, the centripetalist effect of majoritarian institutions functions only if electoral units 
are multi-ethnic (International Crisis Group 1998a: 7), which explains why the effects cannot 
necessarily be expected for presidential elections in countries with an overwhelming ethnic 
majority (Bose 2002: 235-7).7 I compare the outcomes of the Serbian parliamentary elections 
in 2003 to the mayoral elections in 2004, comparing the dynamics in the first and second 
round of the mayoral elections and across municipalities with a varying degree of ethnic 
heterogeneity. 
Several authors have also investigated the mechanisms that led to the election of the 
Radical Party in Serbia in the post-authoritarian period (Stefanović 2008; Konitzer 2008). 
Konitzer, for his part, does not attempt to distinguish between group-specific voting 
behaviour and contextual effects. From his analysis of aggregated data, he concludes that 
different minority groups have different effects on the vote share of the Serbian Radicals. By 
contrast, Stefanović (2008) differentiates between group-effects and contextual effects. Using 
data from national presidential elections, he reports a curvilinear pattern of support for the 
Radical candidates. Hence, he suggests that support of Radical candidates increases in multi-
ethnic environments.8 Differently, our study focuses on the effects of the ethnic context, and 
links them to the effect of the majoritarian electoral system. But before moving on to the 
empirical analysis of whether Key’s effect has been present in Serbia, a short introduction to 
the Serbian party system is required, and an outline of the relevant institutional rules, most 
importantly the electoral system, in the period to which our study refers, 2003-4. 
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3.1. Characterising the dominant issues in the Serbian party system 
 
Nationalising state 
(R): 
The state is exclusively 
for the titular nation. 
Minorities are seen as 
hostile. 
 Moderate 
nationalists 
(DN) 
 Civic-liberal 
orientation (D): 
For equality of all 
citizens. 
 
 Ethnic minority 
parties (E): 
Defending minority 
rights or opting for 
separatism. 
 
Domination of the titular nation Rejection of majority dominance 
Hostility towards minorities Stressing minority rights 
 
Figure 1: The ethnic-nationalist dimension of party systems. 
 
Nationalist-authoritarian values are one of the main pillars of political orientation in Serbia, 
and they also correlate strongly with other political issues (Bochsler 2010a). Figure 1 attempts 
to capture the ethnic-nationalist dimension of the Serbian party system, showing a continuous 
axis of positions which advocate a nationalising state and might even be hostile to ethnic 
minorities, to the advocates of ethnic minority rights and autonomy for ethnic minorities, 
which in the most pronounced cases might involve the calls for separatism. Figure 1 also 
identifies four political blocs, which are organised along this axis (see below). 
Greater Serbia, the promotion of the Serbs as the dominant ethnic group, and the authoritarian 
rejection of civic liberalism were all highly salient on the Serbian political agenda in the 
1990s. They were priorities for both Milošević's party, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), and 
their ally, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). Parties of the group of democratic reformers have 
also intermittently shared a majority nationalist orientation. Promoting Serbia as a civic-
liberal state has been in most periods the goal of the Democratic Party (DS), apart from short 
nationalist interludes. In the post-Milošević period, several issues related to the national 
question have dominated the agenda, namely the question of how to deal with the past and 
how to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
relationships with neighbouring states, minority rights, policies of non-discrimination, and 
democratic values. Most parties belonging to the Democratic reformers take somewhat civic-
liberal stands, with the exception of Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and the small New 
Serbia party (NS), both of which advocate a nationalizing state, promote a strong 
establishment of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and can be characterised as nationalist-conser-
vative (Đurković 2007; Komšić 2003: 48). 
These issues are also closely related to the regime conflict and to Serbian foreign policies. 
The two parties that were the pillars of the Milošević regime, SPS and SRS, belong to the 
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authoritarian-nationalist field and used to be oriented towards Russia rather than the European 
Union, whereas among the pro-European reform parties, we find either the civic-liberal option 
(DS and the Serbian Renewal Movement, SPO), moderate nationalists (DSS and NS), or 
parties of ethnic minorities. The more recently formed G17+ and the Liberal-Democratic 
Party (LDP) have joined the reform-oriented side of the political spectrum. Around 2006, 
DSS and NS have moved away from the project of Western integration, looking for 
cooperation with Russia and opposing NATO membership. 
 
To locate the political parties along this axis, I have asked three experts of party politics in 
Serbia.9 In general, four political blocs can be distinguished in Serbia at the period of 
investigation. First, there are the parties that most strongly advocate a nationalising state, and 
are designated as Radical forces (R). These include SRS and SPS, the Party of the Serbian 
Force (PSS), and two minor parties (SSJ, SNS). The second bloc, the moderate nationalists 
(DN), includes DSS, which in 2003/4, could neither be seen as part of the Radicals, nor of the 
civic-liberal parties. The third bloc, comprised of civic-liberal parties, encompasses the DS, 
G17+, SPO (which competed jointly with the New Serbia party (NS) in 2003) and several 
minor parties (RV, DHSS, Otpor, RSV, DA, LS). The Serbian denomination for these parties 
is the Democrats (D). Finally, the fourth bloc contains the parties of ethnic minorities (E), 
which stand extremely close to the civic-liberal parties. Occasionally, they may even offer 
joint lists with the Democrats or common candidates at different levels of elections. The 
Serbian party system underwent major shifts well after the period of investigation, in 2007/8. 
3.2. Ethnic minority parties 
Most ethnic minorities in Serbia live concentrated in different regions (figure 2). The major 
ethnic parties have been included in several democratically oriented cabinets since 2000.10 
The largest ethnic minority in Serbia, the Hungarians (4% of the population, concentrated 
overwhelmingly in the Vojvodina region) organised themselves under the Democratic Union 
of the Vojvodina Hungarians (DZVM) in 1990. In the 1990s, the party's controversial demand 
for territorial autonomy (Jenne 2004: 741-2) provoked several internal splits, at which point 
the Union of the Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM) became the most important Hungarian 
minority party. Since the 2000s, the Hungarian minority parties have increasingly begun to 
cooperate. They demand a substantial political and cultural autonomy for the eight 
municipalities in Northern Vojvodina that have a high concentration of ethnic Hungarians, but 
have never supported any secessionist claims. 
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Figure 2: Ethnic map of Serbia and of Kosovo (no data).  
Source: Republic Statistical Office of Serbia, Final Results of the Census 2002. Population by national 
or ethnic groups, gender and age groups in the Republic of Serbia, by municipalities. 
 
The Sandžak, in the South of the country, is the second stronghold of ethnically oriented 
parties. It is mostly populated by a Bosniak minority of Serbo-Croat-speaking Muslims who 
comprise the largest ethnic group in neighbouring Bosnia. The first Bosniak party began as a 
Page 10 
local branch of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) from Bosnia, and became independent 
when Bosnia seceded from the former Yugoslavia. SDA leader Sulejman Ugljanin, who 
organised a referendum for the political autonomy of the Sandžak region, was accused of 
trying to engineer Sandžak’s secession from Serbia (ICG 1998b: 8) by Serbian politicians and 
the media. After a split in 1995, and the formation of the less radical Sandžak Democratic 
Party (SDP), the Bosniak political scene remains deeply divided and largely overshadowed by 
physical violence between members of both main party blocs (see also Szöcsik and Bochsler 
2012). 
The third notable region inhabited by an ethnic minority is the Albanian-dominated 
Preševo Valley. Ethnic Albanians (0.8% of the Serbian population) vote almost exclusively 
for several ethnically defined parties, although until 2007 they mainly boycotted national 
elections. After the introduction of a new electoral law, and the abolition of gerrymandered 
districts in the municipality of Bujanovac in 2002, ethnic Albanian parties control the local 
authorities both in Preševo and in Bujanovac, while the third Preševo Valley municipality, 
Medveđa, is controlled by a local Serbian majority. 
Parties representing other minorities have remained small, focusing mainly on local 
politics; only in few instances have they won seats in the national parliament. Parties 
representing the Roma minority have occasionally won up to two seats out of the available 
250. The political conflict with smaller minorities, such as Slovaks, Vlachs/Romanians, 
Croats, Bunjevac, Ukrainians or Russians, who live predominately in multi-ethnic Vojvodina, 
is much less pronounced (Bašić and Crnjanski 2006). 
3.3. Electoral law 
At the national level, the most important institutional restriction on the evolution of Serbia’s 
party system is arguably the legal electoral threshold of 5 percent. While similar rules had 
been in place since the 1990s, they had applied to local electoral districts, and not nationally. 
This had allowed Hungarians, Bosniaks, and Albanians to pass the threshold in the districts 
where they were most highly concentrated. However since then, only the Hungarian minority 
parties have been able to achieve constant representation in the Serbian parliament. The 
shifting of the legal threshold in 2000 from the local to the national level excluded all 
minority parties from running independently in elections, but some of them have repeatedly 
reached the national parliament through electoral alliances, and they have remained 
represented in local and regional institutions. The consequences of the national legal threshold 
were partly reversed in 2007, when the threshold was lifted for ethnic minority parties 
(Bochsler 2008). 
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Elections are also held in the autonomous Vojvodina province and everywhere at the 
municipal level. Municipal elections were scheduled in September 2004, and local 
parliaments (by PR) and local mayors were elected simultaneously. Mayors were elected in a 
two-round majority vote system; the two candidates with most votes entered the runoff.11 No 
municipal elections were held in Kosovo. Mayors of the Belgrade town municipalities were 
elected indirectly, and are excluded from this study. In the subsequent local elections in 2008, 
mayors were elected indirectly through the local parliaments. 
4. The 2004 mayoralty elections  
4.1. The political colour of the elected mayors 
First, we compare the electoral results of the local mayoralty elections in September 2004 
(table 1a) with the closest parliamentary elections in December 2003 (table 1b), looking at 
municipalities with varying concentrations of ethnic minorities. 
The effect is illustrated in figure 3, showing the electoral results of Serbian nationalist 
parties from Serbian municipalities by their ethnic composition (share of minorities living in 
the municipality). The figure shows the results of the main nationalists (SRS) separately, and 
of the whole ultra-nationalist bloc. The lines on figure 3 shows the overall trend. As members 
of ethnic minorities only rarely vote for Serbian nationalists, one would initially expect that 
the vote share of Serbian nationalist parties is negatively correlated with the share of ethnic 
minorities in a municipality,. A radicalising effect of the ethnic structure on the voting 
behaviour of ethnic Serbs would alter this picture: although there are fewer Serbs living in 
multi-ethnic municipalities, compared to ethnic homogeneous ones, these are more likely to 
vote for nationalists, than those living in mono-ethnic places. This leads to curvilinear 
functions, which are clearly visible in figure 3. 
The curvilinear effect emerges both in PR elections (figure 3, left-hand side), and in 
mayoral elections (right-hand side). The effect is a little more pronounced for the main radical 
party (SRS) than for the whole bloc. All of the Serbian nationalist parties demonstrate 
substantial support from municipalities with a very high share of ethnic minorities.12 As this 
happens also under PR, empirical evidence shows support for the threat hypothesis, which 
should apply regardless of the electoral system. 
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  Elected mayor belongs to party coalition....  
Share of 
ethnic 
minorities 
Number of 
municipalities E D-E D DN R 
Local 
citizens’ 
groups others Total 
0-10% 87 0 0 39 19 24 12 5 100
10-20% 14 0 0 12 3 63 22 0 100
20-30% 17 0 12 8 7 54 19 0 100
30-40% 11 0 0 29 5 54 12 0 100
40-50% 2 77 0 0 0 0 23 0 100
>50% 18 63 8 18 2 0 3 7 100
            
Total 149 7 3 29 13 31 13 4 100
Table 1a: Mayors by share of ethnic minority population in municipalities, 2004 local elections (all figures in 
percentages). Municipalities weighted by the number of registered voters. 
E = ethnic minority parties, D = Democrats; D-E = alliance of Democrats with ethnic minority parties; DN = 
moderate nationalists; R = Radicals. 
 
 
Share of 
ethnic 
minorities 
Number of 
municipalities E D DN R (all) R (SRS) Others 
0-10% 87 0 39 19 41 28 1
10-20% 14 3 31 14 50 38 1
20-30% 17 8 36 14 40 32 1
30-40% 11 11 32 13 43 34 1
40-50% 2 14 38 12 35 29 2
>50% 18 28 40 7 24 20 1
         
Total 149 6 37 16 40 29 1
Table 1b: Vote share in national parliamentary elections by PR (in 2003), all figures in percentages. 
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Figure 3: Municipalities by their share of ethnic minorities and Radical votes in the 2003 
parliamentary elections (left graph), and comparing the parliamentary elections 2003 (by PR) 
with the mayoralty elections (1st round, two-round majority vote) (right graph). 
(The lines show fitted values, resulting from an Goodman OLS regression model, weighted by the number 
of voters per municipality, with the ethnic minority share and its square as explanatory variables.) 
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The same pattern emerges for the first round of the two-round majority elections for the 
mayoral offices in 2004, though at a slightly lower level (perhaps because some 12% of the 
votes were cast for local citizens’ groups, and 3% of the vote went to other, unclassified small 
parties). Still, the two-round majority elections for the mayoral offices produced a victory for 
the Radicals in a large portion of the multi-ethnic municipalities. In ethnically homogeneous 
municipalities, by contrast, the Radicals proved able to win only a small portion of the 
mandates, below 10%—far below their PR vote share—and the SRS could rarely win a 
mayoral office. By contrast, the Radicals’ could with 40%-50% of the PR votes win 54%-
63% of the mayor offices in these municipalities. The foremost beneficiary is the SRS (see 
table 1a). In municipalities where the ethnic minorities hold a local majority, the Radicals do 
not win any mayoral mandates. The discrepancy between PR elections and the two-round 
majority vote is patently clear.  
The Democrats (D) perform well in mayoralty elections in homogeneous municipalities 
(those where less than 10 per cent of the electorate belong to minorities). There they won 39% 
of the mandates in the two-round majority elections, more than their vote share in PR 
elections. This would look even more impressive if other parties and local citizen groups had 
not won about a sixth of the mayoral offices in these municipalities. In ethnically mixed 
municipalities with a Serbian majority (10%-40% minorities), however, the Democrats win 
just 10-29% of the mayoral offices – much less than their vote share in PR elections of more 
than 30%. The conservative-nationalist parties (DN)—which we locate between Democrats 
and Radicals on the ethnic-nationalist axis—win their mayoral offices predominantly in 
ethnically homogeneous municipalities. Ethnic minority parties (E) appear predominant in 
municipalities where minorities are closest to being a numerical majority (with more than 
40% minority population). Apart from municipalities where ethnic minorities are a majority, 
minority parties take one additional office in a municipality with a strong ethnic minority 
(specifically, in the Sandžak municipality of Prijepolje, 45% minority population). 
The results show clear evidence for both types of Key’s effect: a general radicalisation 
effect of multi-ethnic contexts, which is accelerated by majoritarian voting systems. 
Democrats do well in ethnically homogeneous municipalities, and particularly so in the two-
round majority vote for the mayor’s office. The Radicals do best under the two-round 
majority vote in mixed-ethnic municipalities (10-40% minorities). To rule out alternative 
explanations (specific concentrations of votes in certain municipalities, selective turnout, 
second-order effects, and party alliances) a few refining tests are needed.  
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4.2. Comparing the mayor election results with the PR elections by municipalities 
We further must confirm that the Radicals’ victories do not stem from an uneven distribution 
of votes in the various municipalities (i.e. the results of intended or accidental 
‘gerrymandering’). If the distribution of voters could make a difference, then the winning 
candidate could be predicted by vote distribution under PR or from the first round election 
results. To rule this out, we analyse the municipalities according to the vote distribution in the 
parliamentary elections 2003 and in the first round of the 2004 mayor elections. 
Table 2 displays the outcomes of the second round of the mayoral elections, ordered by 
the strength of the political blocs in the parliamentary elections in 2003,13 and distinguishing 
municipalities where one political bloc holds an absolute majority. For each type of 
municipalities, we expect a different result of the two-round majority vote. The third expected 
effect is integral for illustrating the electoral system effect on radicalisation. 
1. Party blocs that hold an absolute majority of the votes will either already wins in the first 
round or its candidate(s) will most likely enter the second round and win (all cases in the 
upper part of table 2). Most empirical observations in these groups of cases fit with our 
expectation. 
2. In municipalities with no absolutely dominating bloc, and where the moderate nationalists 
(DN) are among the two strongest blocs, they are likely to enter in the second round of 
voting, and are expected to win in the runoff. However, there is only one exceptional case 
in this group (D+E>DN>R), and a local citizens’ group won the election.14 
3. In all remaining cases, D+E and R are the two largest blocs, but neither of them holds an 
absolute majority. In these cases (R>D+E>DN or D+E>R>DN), we expect a runoff 
between candidates of D+E and R, with DN voters having the pivotal vote for either of the 
two candidates. These are the cases where Key’s effect of ethnically oriented voters might 
come into play. Indeed, candidates of the blocs D+E and R are the most frequent winners 
in these municipalities. 
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 R>DN>D+E R>D+E>DN D+E>R>DN D+E>DN>R 
     
who will enter 
2nd round? 
R versus DN R versus D+E D+E versus R D+E versus DN 
     
who will win?     
 
absolute majority for largest bloc 
expectation R wins R wins D or E wins D or E wins 
empirical results no such 
observations 
fits with 
hypothesis: 56% 
R 
Against hypothesis: 
14% D; 11% E; 6% 
DN; 
Not classifiable: 
12% local citizens’ 
groups; 2% others 
fits with 
hypothesis:  
58% E; 23% D; 
8% D-E;  
Against hypothesis: 
2% R;  
Not classifiable:  
7% others; 3% 
local citizens. 
no such 
observations 
 
no absolute majority 
expectation DN wins DN pivotal voter, 
vote for R in divided 
municipalities, for D 
in homogeneous 
ones 
DN pivotal voter, 
vote for R in divided 
municipalities, for D 
in homogeneous 
ones 
DN wins 
empirical results no such 
observations 
44% R; 22% D; 
12% DN; 
(see table 3) 
Not classifiable: 
19% local citizens; 
3% others 
38% D; 18% R; 
17% DN; 8% E; 6% 
D-E (see table 3) 
Not classifiable: 
10% local citizens; 
5% others 
Not classifiable: 
100% local 
citizens’ groups 
(only 1 
municipality) 
Table 2: Classification of municipalities in Serbia according to the distribution of votes in the 
parliamentary elections 2003; expected and observed outcome in the mayoral elections. 
 
This last group of municipalities, where the Democrats (incl. ethnic minority parties) and the 
Radicals are the two largest blocs, but neither of them holds an absolute majority of the vote, 
is the most relevant for our analysis. These cases also cover the largest number of 
municipalities in Serbia. For these municipalities, we look at the dynamics of the two-round 
elections, and distinguish them by their share of ethnic minorities (table 3). 
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minority share nr obs D-E D DN R local citiz other Total 
 N % % % % % % % 
0-10% 69 0 42 21 21 12 5 100
10-20% 8 0 14 5 70 11 0 100
20-30% 12 14 5 9 51 22 0 100
30-40% 10 0 30 5 51 13 0 100
40-50% 1 0 0 0 0 100 0 100
>50% 2 0 53 48 0 0 0 100
         
Total 102 3 32 16 31 14 4 100
Table 3: Municipalities where D+E and R are the two largest plurality blocs; winners of the 
mayoral mandates, by share of ethnic minorities among the population. Municipalities 
weighted by their population. 
 
In ethnically mixed municipalities, with 10-40% of ethnic minorities, the Radicals are 
much more successful than they are in ethnically homogeneous municipalities, even if their 
actual strength (in PR elections) is similar. As none of these municipalities has a high 
concentration of Radical voters, the Radicals seem to have profited from the two-round 
majority system. 
By contrast, the Democrats became the strongest political party by far under the two-
round majority vote in ethnically homogeneous municipalities. All told, they garnered 42% of 
the available mayoral offices, but – jointly with ethnic minority parties – only 14%-30% of 
the offices in ethnically mixed municipalities (10-40% minorities). 
Out of all 149 analysed Serbian municipalities, such cases, with no absolute majority for 
one party group represent 102 cases, or 77% of the population. Therefore, these 
municipalities, and the pivotal votes of the moderate Nationalists (DN) are decisive for the 
overall picture of the mayoralties in Serbia. Finally, in areas where minorities are dominant, 
and only in those areas, there is a clear majority for the Democrats and ethnic minority parties 
in PR elections (table 4).  
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Absolute majority of PR vote for...  Minority 
share Nr of municipalities R D + E none Total
% N % % % %
0-10 87 11 0 89 100
10-20 14 41 0 59 100
20-30 17 9 5 85 100
30-40 11 5 0 95 100
40-50 2 0 77 23 100
>50 18 12 84 3 100
      
Total 149 12 11 77 100
Table 4: Municipalities, according to the majority of votes for political blocs in PR elections, 
percentage. (Municipalities weighted by their size.) 
 
This does not rule out second-order effects (systematic differences between national and local 
elections), turnout effects, or more idiosyncratic explanations (e.g., voters relying on the 
personality of certain candidates or on local political dynamics). However, second-order 
effects at the local level would likely occur homogeneously throughout the country, and 
would hardly drive such a discernible pattern in ethnically homogeneous and ethnically mixed 
environments. Also, alternative explanations might have difficultly explaining how the 
observed radicalisation effect does not only occur when comparing with the parliamentary 
elections in the previous year, but the effect similarly occurs between the first and the second 
round of the mayoral elections (for detailed results, see supplementary material provided on 
the author's webpage). 
Often, in 39 municipalities, we find pairings of Democrats versus Radicals in the runoff 
election (in other cases, DN candidates or local citizens' group candidates make it to the 2nd 
round). Most often, the larger of the two blocs wins, but the ethnic structure also plays a 
crucial role (see tables 5 & 6). Radical candidates prove more successful in ethnically mixed 
municipalities than in ethnically homogeneous municipalities. In ethnically homogeneous 
municipalities, if Democrats lead in the first round of the elections (left-hand table, D+E > R), 
then they typically emerge victorious in the second round, occasionally even if the Radicals 
were stronger in the first round (right-hand table, R>D+E). Conversely, the Radicals seem to 
gain votes in the second round of elections in mixed-ethnic municipalities: Radical 
candidates, who led after the first round, are almost always elected. 
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D+E > R > DN 
share of 
minorities 
number of 
observations 
D R R 
 N N N % 
0-10% 13 10 3 23 
10-20% 3 2 1 33 
20-30% 3 1 2 67 
30-40% 2 1 1 50 
     
Total 21 14 7 33 
Tables 5 & 6: Who wins if a Democrat runs against a Radical in the second round? 
Municipalities with by share of ethnic minorities among the population. 
 
Since there are only minor differences in turnout between the two rounds,15 and since there is 
no plausible explanation for selective de-mobilisation and mobilisation between the two 
rounds, the turnout explanation can safely be ruled out. Hence, our results strongly indicate 
that Key’s effect is in play, and that it has a particularly strong effect under the two-round 
majoritarian vote in Serbia. In mixed-ethnic municipalities, many voters might perceive the 
Democrats as too liberal and minority-friendly to vote for, and lean instead towards the 
Radicals. One catalyst for this conflict appears to be the animosity between the main 
protagonist of the moderate nationalists, the DSS, and a regional party of the Democrats, the 
League of Vojvodina Social Democrats (LSV), which takes positions that are very close to 
ethnic minorities and is particularly strong in the multiethnic Vojvodina region.16 The 
Democrats’ and the moderate nationalists’ diverging views on ethnic issues appear to have 
fostered alienation in this multi-ethnic environment. In ethnic homogeneous municipalities, 
where ethnic issues are not salient, these differences between the Democrats and the moderate 
nationalists do not emerge as important. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Radicalisation effects in elections in multi-ethnic environments have been well documented in 
the existing literature, and—as mentioned earlier—they have been frequently discussed as 
they pertain to post-WWII state elections in the southern United States. Research going back 
to Key (1949) and Keech (1968) has shown a paradox of voting behaviour in ethnically or 
racially divided communities. Key’s effect addresses the phenomenon of how elected 
politicians are less minority-friendly in these communities than in ethnically homogeneous 
units in territorial units with a higher degree of minorities. This study demonstrates a similar 
R > D+E > DN 
share of 
minorities
number of 
observations
D-E D R R 
 N N N N % 
0-10% 9 0 3 6 67 
10-20% 2 0 0 2 100 
20-30% 3 1 0 2 67 
30-40% 4 0 0 4 100 
      
Total 18 1 3 14 78 
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effect for recent elections in Serbia. The country is not only ethnically divided, but it also 
allows a comparison of electoral system effects across different types of municipalities. In 
carrying out this comparison, our research has suggested a new argument concerning the 
impact of Serbia’s electoral system on the process of ethnic radicalisation. The radicalisation 
effect occurs both under PR and under the two-round majoritarian system, but it is 
considerably stronger in the latter case. 
Two types of arguments can provide an explanation. 
First, we have observed that Radicals —who are the most pronounced advocates of a 
nationalizing state—tend to get larger vote shares in ethnically split places, compared to 
ethnically homogeneous places. This represents a clear manifestation of radicalisation, present 
under any electoral systems: Voters in multi-ethnic environments tend to have nationalist 
views more often than those in ethnically homogeneous places. 
Nevertheless, the Radicals can rely only in rare cases on a majority of the first preferences 
of the voters, which would allow them to win the office in the first round of the mayoral 
elections. Instead, the Radicals enjoy a disproportionate rise in votes between the first and the 
second round of the majority vote elections in ethnically divided places. Most often, Radical 
candidates were entering the runoff against Democrats. While the Democrats typically won 
such races when campaigning in homogeneous environments, in multi-ethnic municipalities, 
the Radicals were able to attract more additional votes than the Democrats, from voters who 
did not vote for either of these blocs in the first round. Apparently, voters in an ethnically 
mixed environment who do not clearly belong to either major party were more prone to opt 
for the Radicals in a two-candidate runoff. By contrast, in ethnically homogeneous 
municipalities, the Democrats were more favoured to win these votes. 
This second type of radicalisation occurs only in two-round majoritarian systems (and, 
possibly, in other majoritarian electoral systems with an absolute majority threshold). Under 
this voting system elections are decided between the two front-running candidates. In multi-
ethnic places, ethnically oriented voters of the majority defect from the more moderate 
candidate, as they perceive her to be heavily supported by voters belonging to the ethnic 
minority. In the Serbian case, Democrat and Radical candidates compete against each other in 
the second round, and moderate nationalists (the Democratic Party of Serbia, DSS) have the 
decisive vote. In line with the model of ethnically oriented voters, they tend to support the 
Radicals in multi-ethnic contexts. In ethnically homogeneous places, however, where no 
members of the minority vote, they seem to vote for the moderate candidates. This 
corresponds closely to the ethnic backlash effect that has been observed in majoritarian voting 
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elsewhere. This second effect explains why the two-round majority vote—to a much greater 
extent than PR—tends to help elect Radicals in ethnically mixed municipalities, and to elect 
Democrats in ethnically homogeneous municipalities. 
These conclusions present a rather pessimistic view of whether electoral engineers can 
actually use majoritarian voting systems to reduce ethnic conflicts in deeply divided societies. 
These findings appear to be in line with other research in this area (Bose 2002: 234); similar 
effects have been reported in other political contexts, even where the ethnic division is not as 
deep as it is in Serbia. Our empirical documentation of the reinforcement of ethnic 
radicalisation through the majority vote is new, however. The same effects might possibly 
apply under similar electoral systems, such as the Alternative Vote, if applied in divided 
societies. An important avenue for further research would be the empirical investigation of the 
properties of other majority voting systems, and whether they can provide incentives that help 
to escape the radicalising effect of the two-round majority vote. This, however, would present 
its difficulties, given the difficulty of studying the effects of an electoral system that has 
hardly ever been applied for elections—let alone in countries that fit the description of a 
divided society. 
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1 If no candidate won an absolute majority of the votes in the first round, then a runoff election decided between 
the two strongest candidates. 
2 At the time of the local elections in 2004, there were incidents against the ethnic Hungarian minority in the 
Vojvodina region (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia 2004), and the Sandžak region remained 
highly destabilised, and several players having "a vested interest to keep ethnic tensions at a high level" 
(International Crisis Group 2005). 
3 Although ethnic differences are constructed, ethnic groups can often times be distinguished by language, 
religion, race, or traditional habits and rites. 
4 Note that the term ‘multi-ethnic parties’ is applied only to parties that include the main ethnic groups that make 
up part of the ethnic conflict (Horowitz 1985: 299). 
5 Bogaards (2003) offers a different view, focussing on African countries. 
6 Barany (2001: 4) provides anecdotal evidence for similar processes under PR. 
7 In the Fiji case, the proponents of the Alternative Vote established the threshold for centripetalist effect around 
10-12% (Horowitz, cited in Fraenkel and Grofman 2006a: 627). 
8 However, the models presented in the study do not reveal any racial backlash effect, as defined here, but rather 
a positive correlation of the Radicals’ strength and the share of the minority population. The second derivate is 
only weakly negative, so that Stefanović’s result suggest that the Radicals’ support is highest in an environment 
that is populated solely by an ethnic minority, and the marginal effect of an increase in the minority population 
would still be positive 
9 Two questions were asked, addressing the parties’ attitudes towards ethnic minorities and the definition of the 
nation-state and the positions regarding dealing with war crimes committed in the recent wars in former 
Yugoslavia (a topic closely related to ethnic relations in Serbia). The answers of the three experts correlated at 
rates of 0.85-0.97, and between the two questions at rates of 0.77-0.81. Results are reported in the online 
appendix A (available on the author's webpage, www.bochsler.eu). 
10 This paragraph relies partly on Bochsler (2010b). 
11 Only in 6 municipalities (out of 149), a candidate was elected in the first round of the elections. 
12 Ethnic data according to the population census 2002. As ethnic majority, we consider persons who declare as 
Serbs, Yugoslavs, and Montenegrins (perceived to be close to Serbs), and persons with unknown ethnicity. 
For three municipalities of the town Niš, the ethnic composition of the whole town is assumed (94.6% ethnic 
majority). 
As parts of the ethnic Albanian population have boycotted the parliamentary elections, the two heavily Albanian 
populated municipalities in the Preševo valley (Preševo, Bujanovac) do not fit the regression line. A further 
outlier is the Bulgarian-populated municipality of Bosilegrad, where the Radicals are not stronger than at the 
national average. Ethnic Bulgarians are only weakly organised politically. 
13 We show here the comparison based on the results of the PR elections, rather than the first round of the two-
round mayor elections. The presence of candidates and/or the vote returns of the first round of mayoralty 
elections might be affected by strategic effects, and/or by the hypothesised effect of majoritarian elections. 
14 If we rely on the votes in the first round mayor elections in order to classify the cases (and these results 
occasionally deviate slightly from the parliamentary elections), we find a few further cases. 
15 In municipalities with a runoff between a Democrat or an ethnic minority candidate, and a Radical, turnout 
dropped on average only 1% from the first to the second round of elections (standard deviation 0.9%). The 
maximal decrease in turnout amounts to 3.3%, the maximal increase to 2.0%. 
16 Information gained through expert interviews in Novi Sad and Belgrade, April 2007. 
